The Skeptics Society & Skeptic magazine

I wish to thank Michael Shermer and his editorial team for sponsoring a debate on Skeptic.com between myself, representing hard determinism, and Stuart Doyle, representing libertarian free will. Doyle began the debate with his essay “Free Will Is Real.”¹ I responded with my own article “A Skeptical Analysis of Doyle’s Defense of Free Will”.² Then Doyle began the second round with his piece “A Reply to Gary Whittenberger’s Critique of My Case for Free Will.”³ And now I will reply to Doyle’s reply to complete the second round.

Doyle and I present, explain, and defend contrasting, inconsistent, and in some ways contradictory models of human decision making. I do believe that the free will model is far inferior to the hard determinism model in so many ways, including conceptual clarity, the reasonableness of premises, and evidential support. However, I cannot say that hard determinism is the clear victor, yet. Much study and research remain to be done. I suspect that one of these days some definitive experiments will be performed which will yield clear results enabling the crowning of the champion – hard determinism. But for now, I will expose the flaws in Doyle’s model and show how the determinist model fares better. I am hardly alone in my position. Many reputable philosophers, scientists, and public intellectuals are now on our determinist team, including Sam Harris, Jerry Coyne, Robert Sapolsky, Richard Dawkins, and Sean Carroll. Even most compatibilists favor some form of determinism with reservations or qualifications. In a survey of philosophers on the topic of free will, only 13.7 percent endorsed libertarianism and on the topic of the mind only 27.1 percent endorsed non-physicalism.^{4, 5} In the first century or perhaps even in the 16^th century Doyle would have been in the majority among experts, but in this 21^st century he is definitely in the minority.

As I did in my reply to Doyle’s first essay, here I will quote liberally from Doyle’s second essay to prevent any misunderstandings. I have used quotation marks to delineate his words, unless otherwise indicated.

“My first article makes three main points: We are the true sources of our own actions because the whole human, not the parts, is the correct scale at which to examine free will.”

I strongly disagree. ‘Willing’ is simply making decisions, and I will simplify our debate by focusing on a single paradigm of decision making – choosing between two options. The whole human includes many parts, including the heart, kidneys, skin, feet, bones, eyes, and brain. Of all the parts of the whole human, only the brain makes choices between two options. And thus, Doyle’s choice of scale is patently false.

“Because of an asymmetry in time, the right criterion for free will is the ability to be unpredictable in principle.”

This is surely mistaken. Making a choice between two options is simply not free, and this is true regardless of the predictability of the choice. What does “free” mean? It means unconstrained, unlimited, undetermined, untethered, or unregulated. Making a choice is very likely, almost certainly, determined by brain processes which represent either a chance mechanism (usually in the case of ‘ties’ between the two options) or prior factors such as genetics, environment, rearing, or life experience. There is far more evidence for the determined choice hypothesis than for the free choice hypothesis. Doyle has not come close to proving or even substantially supporting his position.

“We are fundamentally unpredictable because we each have the properties of an undecidable system.”

What is an “undecidable system”? Doyle does not provide a definition. Nor does he show how this concept is related to making choices between two options. In addition, Doyle has not come close to rationally showing that we are “fundamentally unpredictable” in our two-option choices. If the underlying system is determined, as I and others have hypothesized, then ultimately we should get quite good at predicting a brain’s decisions.

“The first point is an argument against determinists like Sam Harris who say that though the subjectively felt intention to act is the proximate cause of acting, there are ultimately other physical causes beyond our control.”

Doyle does not provide a quote from Sam Harris on this point. Simply citing a podcast interview of Harris in the reference section is insufficient. I remain skeptical that Harris made this assertion. I believe that felt intentions are not causes of acting at all, but instead represent or reflect brain processes which are the causes. Doyle provides no evidence that felt intentions cause choices or actions.

“But as it stands, my first point is vulnerable to objection from a philosophical position known as ‘epiphenomenalism.’ This view proposes that a mental event (such as intending to act) is not even a proximate cause of a physical event (such as acting). According to the epiphenomenalists, mental events do not affect physical events any more than the motions of a car’s shadow affects the motions of the car.”

This is an adequate statement of the epiphenomenal position.

“Whittenberger certainly has not provided any argument for epiphenomenalism, but his assertion of it, if true, would pose a serious problem for the first main point in my previous article. Below, I’ll give a defense against the epiphenomenalist objection.”

Although other relevant experts might not concur, I think Doyle and I would agree that some form of dualism is true – that reality consists of at least two kinds of events – physical events and mental events. Examples of mental events are an intention to act, imagining an apple, and “subvocal sentences in the head.” Examples of physical events include actions themselves and firings of neurons in networks. So far, mental events can only be ‘observed’ by the subject himself, whereas physical events can be observed by persons who are not the subject. And so we say that mental events are subjective, whereas physical events are objective. It is now well accepted in the 21^st century that physical events have the power to influence and cause other physical events. But there is no good evidence and no scientific consensus that mental events have the power to influence and cause physical events. Until there is, the epiphenominalist position should be the default position. The burden of proof is actually on Doyle.

“But first I’ll address several other of Whittenberger’s assertions, which are easier to answer. I’ll Start with one of Whittenberger’s basic misunderstandings. In response to my second main point (2), He writes:”

This is false because Doyle, as most free will advocates do, has confused determinism with predictability. Our choices are probably determined (except perhaps when chance plays a role), whether or not our choices are predictable either by ourselves or by other people.

“The claim that I have confused determinism with predictability, ironically exhibits confusion on Whittenberger’s part. I do exactly the opposite of conflation between determinism and predictability; I delineate them. Usually, deterministic processes are assumed to be ultimately predictable, but I describe how they can be fundamentally unpredictable.”

This is not a delineation, but I will attempt to provide one. Choosing between two options is determined, if and only if a process which is given the same input always yields the same output. However, even if the system is deterministic, we may be unable to accurately predict the output without sufficient knowledge of the inputs and the intervening process. So for practical purposes, high predictability results from a highly deterministic system plus sufficient knowledge or understanding of the system.

“By drawing on the concept of undecidability, I show that determinism and predictability are not inextricably linked.”

No. Doyle does not show what he claims here to have shown. He does not define “undecidability.” He does not show the relationship of this concept to determinism and predictability. And he does not show the relevance of this concept to a simple decision scenario like the two-option choice situation.

“In this way, I clearly characterize determinism and predictability as two distinct and independent properties.”

We agree that they are distinct and independent, but still they are going to be positively significantly correlated. The greater the determinism, the greater the predictability.

“In my first article, I spend about 600 words arguing that predictability is the right criterion for free will.”

The argument does not succeed. “Free” means “not determined.” It does not mean “not predicted” or “not predictable.”

“Whittenberger disputes this but does not engage with the argument at all. He offers no reason for his disagreement on this main point, other than his confused accusation of confusion.”

At best, Doyle’s argument is unclear, and at worst, it is mangled.

“In a similar manner, Whittenberger misunderstands my third main point (3), and asserts its negation without engaging with its supporting arguments:”

What you are expected to do, however, depends on what we know about how brains work and what we know about your brain and your history. We may come to a point in the future of neuroscience and behavior science where what we expect you to do will be exactly what you in fact do, especially if determinism is true, as we currently believe.

What’s wrong with this? It seems accurate to me.

“I argue in the ‘Self-Reference and Undecidability’ section of my article that it is in principle not possible to perfectly predict the deliberative decisions of human beings—neither now nor in the future.”

The argument does not succeed. It lacks proper definitions and explication of relationships, especially pertaining to the concepts of “self-reference” and “undecidability.”

“The case laid out in that section is meant to disprove the common assumption that all human behavior could be predictable, given enough data and analysis. Whittenberger merely reasserts the common assumption, as if I had not yet heard of the basic idea I set out to topple.”

Doyle did not succeed in his attempted disproof. If determinism is true and if we have enough knowledge of the algorithm and inputs to the algorithm, then we should be able to predict the outcomes of all or most two-option choices, except when the options are tied, which is usually not the case. I speculate that when the algorithm does not yield a definite choice of either option, i.e. when the options are tied, then the brain uses a subroutine of “picking randomly.” However, even the outputs of this subroutine might be predictable with enough knowledge.

“The problem here is likely that Whittenberger has not bothered to fully digest the concept of undecidability.”

The problem here is that the concept of undecidability is indigestible.

“One of the necessary features of an undecidable system is the potential to access an infinite computational medium. That is the same thing as having an infinite state-space, as I describe in my article.”

I must say that this sounds like what we call “woo” in skeptical circles. Doyle is wildly throwing around terms without telling us in plain language what they mean. Examples are “undecidable system,” “infinite computational medium,” and “infinite state-space.” This is not helpful.

“Whittenberger mistakenly believes that the number of available options has some kind of bearing on the issue:”

But more importantly, individual decisions in real time have a finite options-space. For example, if you are going to a Baskin-Robbins Store to get ice cream, your options set will probably consist of only a few specific ice creams of a few specific flavors.

“A system with only two options can be undecidable, which means that it is impossible to predict which of the two options will actualize.”

This appears to be a tautology since Doyle is implying that “undecidable” just means “unpredictable”. This is not helpful. It might be better if he said, “In my opinion there are some choices between two options which are unpredicatable.” That clearer statement might lead us to running some experiments.

“This is the case in the most simple textbook example of undecidability: the halting problem in Turing machines. One must lack even cursory knowledge of undecidability in order to think that a finite options-space rules out unpredictability. As the one who introduced the concept to Whittenberger, I am partially responsible for this failure.”

Doyle did not give any explanation of “the halting problem in Turing machines” or tell how it is relevant to our topic. I suspect that it isn’t relevant. Doyle has not shown that all two-option choices are unpredictable either in practice or in principle.

“Now for the next family of missteps, we turn to a concept introduced by Whittenberger: the “decision-making mechanism” (DMM). The DMM is a hypothetical part of the brain that supposedly makes decisions. It incorporates information from all other parts of the brain in order to make its decisions, yet those other parts of the brain are arbitrarily excluded from Whittenberger’s definition of the DMM.”

Those other parts of the brain produce outputs which are inputs to the DMM. There is no “arbitrary exclusion.” Just think of a proper flow chart here.

“According to Whittenberger, the other parts of the brain store representations of our genetics, environment, life experiences, and their interactions, while the DMM takes those representations as inputs for a complicated algorithm that spits out a decision.”

There is no “spitting.” Spitting is impolite. In my view the DMM has inputs, an algorithmic process, and an output. The complexity of the algorithm will vary with the number of factors on which the options are compared. Suppose the subject is choosing to buy one of two options in the ice cream store. She might compare the two options on just flavor and price, and so here the algorithm is likely to be pretty simple. On the other hand, suppose the subject is choosing to accept one of two jobs after graduation from engineering school. She might compare the two options on ten factors such as nature of the work, salary, retirement compensation, work environment, local cost of living, advancement potential, creativity opportunity, distance from family and friends, personality of the supervisor, and length of a training period. And so here the algorithm is likely to be much more complex. (When there are more than two options in a choice situation, the algorithm would need to run many times.)

“So the difference between our views is that I claim decisions come from the functioning nervous system taken as one whole entity (a person), while Whittenberger insists that the decision making part is partitioned in some important way from the other parts.”

Doyle had claimed that decisions come from the whole person, but he is mistaken. The whole person has parts which do not participate in or make decisions. Your big toe does not make decisions. Your brain makes decisions, and there is likely to be one part or one neuronal circuit of your brain that makes the decisions. I have called this part the “Decision Making Mechanism” or DMM. In the 20^th and 21^st centuries we have learned a great deal about the specialization in parts of the brain, and these advances are likely to continue. I predict that in the next 20 years the DMM will be identified.

“I give a reason in my article for why I think the whole person is the right unit of analysis; when analyzing the will, we should be talking about what most people mean when they say that they will to do something.”

Doyle is mistaken on both these points. In analyzing the will (making choices between options), the brain in general and the DMM more specifically is the right unit of analysis. What experts talk about on this subject should supersede what “most people” talk about. Folk psychology is not a reliable basis for a science of the brain and mind.

“They are talking about desires, intentions, decisions, and commitments that are experienced.”

These mental events can be part of the analysis, but there is no good evidence that they have causal powers.

“Most people would agree that the thermostat on my wall should not count as having a will. The reason is that the thermostat does not experience anything, though it does make ‘decisions’ in an impoverished sense of the word. Will has dimensions of experience.”

Again, I don’t know why we should place so much emphasis on what “most people” think. I agree with Doyle that the thermostat probably does not experience anything. It doesn’t have mental events. Does it make decisions? Well, it depends on how we define “decision.” The thermostat makes responses. When human brains make two-option decisions, these decisions are often, but not always, accompanied by “dimensions of experience” or mental events. But we, i.e., our brains, can make decisions without any conscious experience of them!

“Whittenberger equivocates between willful choosing and ‘choosing’ in the thermostat sense. Willful choosing involves the nuanced textures of experience that can’t exist without a whole person, including a qualitative integration of memories, present senses, and imagined futures.”

The brain chooses between two options. This choice is probably determined, although in the case of ties, it may be made by a ‘chance subroutine.’ The choice may be accompanied by an experience or mental event, but it need not be. Where do I equivocate here? I don’t.

“Whittenberger offers no argument against the whole person as the source of decisions, and he offers no argument for the DMM as the source of decisions.”

In this second rebuttal essay, I did offer a strong “argument” against the whole person as the source of decisions. I hope that upon further reflection, Doyle does not disagree that the brain is the source of decisions. But I go one step further. I hypothesize that within the brain there is a part, a neural circuit, or a physical function which actually makes the decisions, receiving inputs and yielding an output. Why is this likely to be true? First, the brain has parts specializing in function. The somato-sensory cortex collects inputs from different skin areas of the body. The auditory nerve carries auditory information from the ears to the auditory cortex. The cerebellum coordinates muscle movements. Need I go on? Secondly, all two-option decisions have a similar conceptual structure. They have inputs. They have an output – selection of option X or Y. They compare options on factors pertinent to the options. I gave some examples of this in my ice cream and job choice scenarios. For these two reasons, it is likely that the DMM exists and will be identified. I suggest that the breakthrough will be facilitated by the use of fMRI (or other scanning devices) and AI in combination.

I’ll briefly offer a suggestion on how the algorithm of the DMM might work. It might calculate the overall value of each option in the choice scenario by combining component values on relevant factors, e.g. V = ax + by + cz + v. It may then operate on the rule ‘Select the option with the highest overall value at the present time.’ In cases of ties in the overall values of the options, then the brain is likely to rely on a ‘random subroutine.’ This is only one suggestion for the algorithm, and others should certainly be considered.

“Such an argument would surely be needed since the concept of the DMM seems incoherent under scrutiny, as I will now show.”

I have shown in this essay that the concept of the DMM is coherent and perfectly rational.

“If the DMM takes inputs from other parts of the brain where those inputs are represented, then where does the DMM represent the inputs which it receives?”

Just think of a flow chart. There may be many parts of the brain which send inputs to the DMM. The algorithm of the DMM incorporates these inputs. Think of the algorithm as an equation with variables and constants combined in a structured way. That is the framework for explaining the DMM, but of course the details will be filled in after significant research.

“The DMM is supposed to integrate memories into the decision making process. Memories are stored in a distributed way, involving all of the brain areas which were involved in the original experience of the remembered event. There is no other way for the brain to represent memories.”

I think “no other way” is too strong an assertion here, but I buy the general description. But it doesn’t really matter. The DMM could receive inputs from many widely scattered sources or locations. No problem.

“That means the DMM, which by definition excludes most parts of the brain, has no way to represent the memories which it supposedly uses in its algorithm.”

Of course it would! It’s neurons ‘all the way down.’

“The only apparent way out of this problem would be to say that the representational parts of the brain send compressed gists of memories, not full episodic memories with their visual dimensions, emotional dimensions, auditory dimensions, etc. to the DMM. But this isn’t really a way out.”

I have already provided a “way out.”

“In order to construct a compressed gist of a memory that works for decision making, it needs to be determined which aspects of the memory are relevant to the decision at hand. But in order to assess the relevance of the various aspects of memory, the whole memory must be directly available to be assessed.”

Not necessarily. There could be neuronal processes intermediate between the stored memories and the DMM which represent factors, like ice cream flavor or salary of a job, which then become inputs to the DMM. The details will need to be filled in by careful research.

“And relevance is not binary; the more relevant and less relevant aspects of memory should be registered as such in the making of any decision. That relevance ranking is one of the main things that would be needed from a decision making algorithm.”

Relevance could be binary in some cases. Relevance must be encoded in neuronal processes. The flow chart can be expanded and complicated as needed to fit the data. Relevance could be evaluated prior to or within the DMM. Not a problem.

“Such an algorithm can’t function without direct access to full memory representations, which are distributed throughout the whole brain.”

“Can’t”? What is Doyle’s evidence for this assertion? Why couldn’t partial memory representations be used? Memories may be widely distributed without being represented in the “whole brain.”

“There is no way for Whittenberger’s postulated DMM to do this. The whole person is a far more plausible decision maker.”

There are lots of ways for the DMM to do this. I have already refuted Doyle’s ‘whole person as decider’ hypothesis.

“The person at least exists, which can be proven to anyone who tries to coherently doubt his own existence.”

Of course, the whole person exists, but it is not what makes the decisions, as I have already shown.

“The existence of the DMM can not be verified to this epistemic standard.”

Doyle has not shown that the DMM “cannot be verified,” but I do agree that it has not yet been verified. There are good reasons to believe and predict that it will be verified, as I have shown.

“It is arbitrarily delineated from the rest of the brain, yet unspecified in its physical and computational form.”

This is just a false statement. I have not delineated the DMM arbitrarily, but I have delineated it by function! Other parts of the brain have been similarly delineated by function. I have given an outline for its computational form. It will be found to be composed of neurons in some kind of circuit.

“Its supposed informational inputs are implausible, which makes its basic functionality implausible.”

Of course, the informational inputs and functionality of the DMM are plausible. Doyle has not proven otherwise. Plausibility is a low standard, which I have easily met.

“The mechanistic nature of the DMM is supposed to reduce away the human agent, but the DMM is itself presumably made of mechanistic parts with their own causal rules of ‘decision,’ so it may as well be reduced away to elementary particles.”

As I have already shown, the “human agent” is not the proper level of analysis here. Of course, the DMM would be mechanistic and have mechanistic parts. It’s mechanisms ‘all the way down.’ It’s not magic!

“All things considered, I don’t think I can believe in anything so mystical as the DMM.”

Neither the brain as a whole nor the hypothetical DMM is mystical or magical. The usual features are referenced: neuronal processes and circuits, mechanisms, natural laws, physical reality.

“Now I’ll move on to address epiphenomenalism, the philosophical view which, if true, would pose a serious problem for the first main point (1) in my first Skeptic article. Here is Whittenberger’s presentation:”

Our conscious desires and intentions often precede our choices, but this hardly means that they cause them. It could be the case, and probably is the case, that both our conscious desires and intentions and our choices are caused by a third factor which precedes them both. And so, I believe the author is making a classical thinking error known as “post hoc, ergo propter hoc.” As we all learned in graduate school, correlation does not necessarily indicate causation, even when the correlation is sequential.

“Of course, taking such a hard line skeptical attitude toward causation would obliterate the validity of Whittenberger’s own proposed ‘test of determinism,’ which completely depends on correlation.”

There is no hard line here. Sequential correlation does not necessarily indicate causation. For example, if you pray to God that there will be an open parking space for you and then it turns out that there is, then this does not necessarily ensure that the prayer caused the open spot. Similarly, if a conscious intention occurs before an action, this does not necessarily ensure that the intention caused the action.

“The only way Whittenberger’s DMM hypothesis could ever be supported by research on brain and behavior would be by observed correlations between localized brain activity and behavior.”

Doyle is forgetting here that a sequential correlation is necessary, but not sufficient to infer causation.

“When scientists find that certain patterns of activity in a monkey’s dorsal premotor cortex correlate with the monkey’s subsequent choice, does Whittenberger declare ‘post hoc, ergo propter hoc’? Certainly not. Suddenly correlation does indicate causation, when it’s convenient. And it has to.”

My inference has nothing to do with convenience. It has to do with additional evidence. There are many studies of brain damage, brain stimulation, or other brain alteration which show that changes in the brain cause changes in the mind. And some of these changes are intentionally brought about by a clinician or researcher. I refer Doyle to familiar studies on the effects of splitting the corpus callosum in epileptic patients, the effects of subjects taking LSD, and the producing of vivid hallucinations during Penfield’s electrical stimulation of brains. From these studies we can see how causation can be inferred. They entail more than sequential correlation.

“As David Hume pointed out 275 years ago, there is nothing else but correlation to observe when looking for causation.”

“Nothing else”? I think Hume just didn’t look deep enough. In addition to temporal correlation, we can look at experimental manipulations.

“My presumption of causal mental states is no more threatened by charges of ‘post hoc, ergo propter hoc’ than is the presumption of causal action potentials.

Doyle is just mistaken here. There is an important difference. The hypothesis of ‘brain states cause or produce mental states’ can actually be investigated experimentally, whereas the hypothesis of ‘mental states cause or produce brain states’ cannot, or at least nobody, including Doyle, has suggested an efficient methodology for doing this.

“The epiphenomenalist denies that the mental can affect the physical. But he seems unreasonably comfortable with the fact that the physical can affect the mental.”

I disagree. We epiphenomenalists feel reasonably comfortable and very confident that the physical can affect the mental. We have much evidence supporting our view, while Doyle has little or no evidence to support his.

“Such one-way causation would be special in the world of causation. A bowling pin is the kind of thing that can be affected by a bowling ball because the bowling ball is the kind of thing that can be affected by a bowling pin. Actions and reactions are the rule in causation.”

The bowling ball does affect the bowling pins, but the shadows created by the pins neither affect the pins nor the ball. The shadow-to-pin relationship is one of representation, reflection, or indication, not of causation! In the same way, it is likely that mental events represent, reflect, or indicate neuronal events, but do not cause or influence neurons in any way. This is the core of epiphenomenalism.

“Even a car’s shadow exerts a tiny vacuum force on the car.”

Even if this were true, the force is minuscule and does not alter what we see in the motion of the car. Again, the shadow is representative. The car’s engine is causal.

“Epiphenomenalists unwittingly postulate the only exception to actions and reactions. Why should such an exception be expected? How does it work? Why aren’t there more exceptions? These questions are probably not any more tractable than the question of how the mental can affect the physical. And without answers to these questions, the epiphenomenalist is committing the fallacy of special pleading.”

There is no special pleading here. Doyle’s questions for epiphenomenalists, like myself, are appropriate, and we have answered all or nearly all of them.

“The draw of epiphenomenalism seems to be our mere lack of knowledge about how the mental might affect the physical. We can’t see any mechanism which connects the two. But this lack of apparent connection works both ways.”

No, it does not work both ways! We have good evidence, reasons, and arguments to conclude that brain events affect, influence, or cause mental events. But the converse is not true.

“That’s what’s so hard about the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness; there is no apparent necessary connection between matter and conscious experience.”

I disagree. There is good evidence that conscious, subjective, or mental experience arises from and is completely dependent on brain events, probably neuronal events.

“But since we know that conscious experience does exist, we should conclude that the lack of apparent necessary connection between mental and physical is only a feature of our ignorance. It can not imply that there is no connection. We should not be fooled by our mere failure to see a connection in either direction.”

Here Doyle misrepresents the state of philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology. Of course, conscious experience exists! Of course, brain events exist! There appears to be a necessary connection between them: Brain events cause mental events, but mental events do not cause brain events. Mental events represent, reflect, or indicate brain events. That’s the consensus of experts right now.

“But we do have a good reason to reject epiphenomenalism: it relies on special pleading, failing to justify its needed exception to the rule of action and reaction. This is my preliminary argument against epiphenomenalism. Other writers have already made many other arguments for and against, with the dispute showing no signs of final resolution. So I don’t expect this brief treatment to conclude the issue for those in the field.”

No, so far we do not have good reason to reject epiphenomenalism. There is no special pleading for it. A reaction may be merely a representation.

“But my argument should be enough to answer Whittenberger’s unargued claims. Nothing in either of his articles should lead to any doubt about the realities of free will”

I have made strong arguments for my claims, much stronger than Doyle has made for his. Our skepticism about “free will” is warranted. When we make a choice between two options, our choice is dependent on pre-existing factors, usually many of them, and it is certainly not “free.” Our brains almost always choose the option valued the more highly.

“We humans are the true sources of our own actions because the whole human, not his parts, is the correct scale at which to examine free will. Because of an asymmetry in time, the right criterion for free will is the ability to be unpredictable in principle. We humans are fundamentally unpredictable because we each have the properties of an undecidable system.”

Our brain is the true source of our own actions because the brain is the part of us which specializes in collecting information, processing it, and using it to select and initiate action. Our right big toe doesn’t do this. Our liver doesn’t do this. Our brain does this. Doyle is just using the wrong scale to analyze decision making. He has not rationally demonstrated that human decisions are either undecidable, fundamentally unpredictable, or undetermined, and I doubt that he or anybody else will.